Abstract. In this paper we propose a formal framework for studying privacy. Our framework is based on the π-calculus with groups accompanied by a type system for capturing privacy requirements relating to information collection, information processing and information dissemination. The framework incorporates a privacy policy language. We show that a system respects a privacy policy if the typing of the system is compatible with the policy. We illustrate our methodology via analysis of privacy-aware schemes proposed for electronic traffic pricing.
Introduction
The notion of privacy is a fundamental notion for society and, as such, it has been an object of study within various scientific disciplines. Recently, its importance is becoming increasingly pronounced as the technological advances and the associated widespread accessibility of personal information is redefining the very essence of the term privacy.
A study of the diverse types of privacy, their interplay with technology, and the need for formal methodologies for understanding and protecting privacy is discussed in [19] , where the authors follow in their arguments the analysis of David Solove, a legal scholar who has provided a discussion of privacy as a taxonomy of possible privacy violations [18] . According to Solove, privacy violations can be distinguished in four categories: invasions, information collection, information processing, and information dissemination. Invasion-related privacy violations are violations that occur on the physical sphere of an individual. The authors of [19] concentrate on the latter three categories and they identify a model for studying them consisting of the data holder possessing information about the data subject and responsible to protect this information against unauthorized adversaries within the environment.
The motivation of this paper stems from the need of developing formal frameworks for reasoning about privacy-related concepts. Such frameworks may provide solid foundations for understanding the notion of privacy and allow to rigorously model and study privacy-related situations. More specifically, our objective is to develop a static method for ensuring that a privacy policy is satisfied by an information system using the π-calculus as the underlying theory.
To achieve this objective, we develop a meta-theory for the π-calculus that captures privacy as policy. Following the model of [19] , we create a policy language that enables us to describe privacy requirements for private data over data entities. private data we expect entities to follow different policy requirements. Thus, we define policies as objects that describe a hierarchical nesting of entities where each node/entity of the hierarchy is associated with a set of privacy permissions. The choice of permissions encapsulated within a policy language is an important issue because identification of these permissions constitutes, in a sense, a characterization of the notion of privacy. In this work, we make a first attempt of identifying some such permissions, our choice emanating from the more obvious privacy violations of Solove's taxonomy which we refine by considering some common applications where privacy plays a central role.
As an example consider a medical system obligated to protect patient's data. Inside the system a nurse may access patient files to disseminate them to doctors. Doctors are able to process the data without any right to disseminate them. Overall, the data cannot be disclosed outside the hospital. We formalize this policy as follows: where t is the type of the patient's data. The policy describes the existence of the Hospital entity at the higher level of the hierarchy associated with the nondisclose permission signifying that patient data should not be disclosed outside the system. Within this structure, a nurse may access (but not read) a patient file and disseminate the file once (disclose Hospital 1). Similarly a doctor may be given access to a patient file but is also allowed to read and write data within the files (permissions access, read and write).
Moving on to the framework underlying our study, we employ the π-calculus with groups [5] . This calculus extends the π-calculus with the notion of groups and an associated type system in a way that controls how data is being disseminated inside a system. It turns out that groups give a natural abstraction for the representation of entities in a system. Thus, we build on the notion of a group of the calculus of [5] , and we use the group memberships of processes to distinguish their roles within systems. Information processing issues can be analysed through the use of names of the calculus in input, output and object position to identify when a channel is reading or writing private data or when links to private data are being communicated between groups.
An implementation of the hospital scenario in the π-calculus with groups would be
In this system, (νHospital) creates a new group that is known to the two processes of the subsequent parallel composition while (Nurse) and (Doctor) are groups nested within the Hospital group and available to processes a l .0 and a(x).x(y).x d .0, respectively. The group memberships of the two processes characterize their nature while reflecting the entity hierarchy expressed in the privacy policy defined above. The types of the names in the above process are defined as y : t, d : t, that is y and d are values of sensitive data, while l : Hospital[t] signifies that l is a channel that can be used only by processes which belong to group Hospital to carry data of type t. Similarly, a : Hospital[Hospital [t] ] states that a is a channel that can be used by members of group Hospital, to carry objects of type Hospital [t] . Intuitively, we may see that this system conforms to the defined policy, both in terms of the group structure as well as the permissions exercised by the processes. Instead, if the nurse were able to engage in
